

## **Cultures of the Tea Party<sup>1</sup>**

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### **Abstract:**

Using data from a telephone poll conducted in the summer of 2010 in North Carolina (n= 1,164) and Tennessee (n=1,295) and a follow up poll from the fall of 2010 in the same states (total n=561), we examine the political and cultural dispositions of Tea Party movement (TPM) supporters. Our data reveal four primary cultural dispositions that suggest TPM support is correlated with the Republican party but can best be understood as a new cultural expression of late 20<sup>th</sup> century conservatism. These four dispositions are: authoritarianism, ontological insecurity, libertarianism, and nativism. We also utilize short interviews conducted at a TPM rally in eastern NC to bolster our polling results and comment on the syncretic cultural work being done by the TPM to mobilize popular support. In a third survey conducted in the Spring of 2011 (n=[x]), we find that Tea Party supporters had become more conservative on politicized issues, while attitudes on other issues did not change.

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## Cultures of the Tea Party

“I call it our now and never rally. ‘Cause it definitely is now or never.”

“And all of us believe in going back to the Constitution, the roots of our country. Making a city on a hill, trying to make a city on a hill of America again. Which is what the Constitution made for us. And uh, we amended it and we trounced it, and we didn’t worry about, and we left it alone and ignored it until I believe that’s the major problem with America today.”

The Tea Party Movement (TPM) is *the* story of the 2010 midterm elections. Enigmatic and multifaceted as it is, the TPM captured the attention of voters, pundits, and politicians between the Democratic wave of 2008 and the Republican resurgence of 2010. It represents the most recent cultural expression of the Republican Party coalition that formed during the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

In the wake of the 2008 election, in the midst of the economic meltdown and the health care reform debate, local protests loosely organized under the banner of the Tea Party began to emerge from Boston to Tennessee to Chicago. There is no hard and fast beginning to the TPM, but many date its start to the so-called “Santelli Rant.” On February 19, 2009, CNBC commentator Rick Santelli complained from the floor of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange about the proposed mortgage relief program: “How many people want to pay for your neighbor's mortgages that has [sic] an extra bathroom and can’t pay their bills? Raise their hand!” He called for “another Tea Party” to protest the policies. By December 2009, 41 percent of Americans said they viewed the movement positively.

What, though, is the TPM? It has been described as an angry right-wing rebellion, a racist backlash to President Obama’s election, a routine Republican correction to the Democratic wave of 2008, and more. The movement fuses populist anger with limited-government politics, conservative social concerns, support for the free market and a nostalgic loyalty to a vision of Revolution-era America. Importantly, these various political strands are interwoven with powerful cultural motifs drawn from history and a theatrical use of images, language and stories.

In exploring the TPM, we set out to determine if general public support for the movement

represents a *new* political and cultural phenomenon or whether it is simply realignment within the Republican Party. Specifically, what are the political and cultural dispositions of Tea Party supporters?

Our study included two telephone polls of registered voters in North Carolina and Tennessee and a set of interviews and observations at a TPM rally in Washington, North Carolina. The first poll was conducted May 30-June 3, 2010, and had a total of 4,494 respondents (2,378 in Tennessee and 2,116 in North Carolina). In our poll, 46% of respondents felt favorably toward the TPM, which was slightly higher than the national average at the time, but consistent with what one might expect from residents of this traditionally conservative region. The second poll, conducted between September 29 and October 3, 2010 collected information on 692 of the original respondents to determine how their views had changed. At the TPM rally we conducted short interviews with ten participants, and took photographs and field notes related to the various forms of cultural expression (signs, handouts, costumes).

We discovered four primary cultural dispositions among those who feel positively toward the TPM: authoritarianism, ontological insecurity, libertarianism and nativism.

- **Authoritarianism:** this dimension captures beliefs that obedience by children is more important than creativity (Stenner 2005), and that deference to authority is an important value. For example, 81 % of TPM supporters agree that it is more important that a child obeys his parents, as opposed to being responsible for his own actions; in contrast only 65 % of non-TPM supporters agree with this position.
- **Libertarianism:** this dimension captures beliefs that there should not be regulations or limitations on expressions such as clothing, television shows, and musical lyrics. In our poll, 24 % of TPM supporters believe there should be fewer rules regulating what can be posted on the Internet and who can read it; in contrast, 16 % of non-TPM supporters hold this view.
- **Nativism:** this dimension includes negative attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. Eighteen percent of TPM supporters feel very negatively toward immigrants compared to 12 % for non-TPM supporters.

- Fear of change/ontological insecurity: this dimension involves the sense that things are changing too fast or too much. Concern about the pace of change has recently been shown to be a primary motivator for a variety of cultural conflicts and protest in the US (Tepper 2011). This is consistent with earlier right wing movements based in status defense and organized around traditionalism, nostalgia and the idea of returning to a simpler, purer past. In our poll, 51 % of people who are very concerned about “changes taking place in American society these days” were TPM supporters compared to just 21 % of those who were only somewhat or not at all concerned.

In this paper, we explore the relationship between these four strands and support for the TPM in a series of logistic regression models. The polls were conducted by Public Policy Polling, which was ranked as one of the most accurate pollsters of the 2008 and 2010 cycle by multiple rankings, using their standard IRVInteractive Voice Response (IVR) method.

We measure authoritarian disposition by summing responses to three questions about attitudes toward child rearing. These included, “would you say it is more important that a child obeys his parents, or that he is responsible for his own actions,” “would you say it is more important that a child has respect for his elders, or that he thinks for himself,” and “would you say it is more important that a child follows his own conscience, or that he follows the rules.” We coded respondents who answered obey parents, respect for elders, and follow rules, respectively, as providing the more authoritarian response.

We measure libertarianism by summing disagreement with statements on regulations of personal expression. These include, “There should be more rules about what can be shown on television these days,” “There should be more rules about what people can wear in parks, shopping centers, and other public places these days,” and “There should be more rules about what can be posted on the Internet and who can read it.” For each question, we scored strong disagreement as a three, mild disagreement as a two, and neutrality as a one, with the final libertarianism score representing the sum of these.

We measure nativism by summing responses to three questions on immigration. These

include, “Do you think the children of people who have immigrated to this country illegally should continue to qualify as American citizens if they are born in the United States,” “Do you think immigrants who came into this country illegally but pay taxes and have not been arrested should be given the opportunity to become permanent legal residents,” and “Now, how about immigrants?” We coded respondents who answered no opportunity to become citizens or felt negatively about immigrants as providing the more nativist response.

We measured ontological insecurity based on whether or not the respondent was “very concerned” about “the changes taking place in American society these days.”

We rescaled each of our four cultural dispositions measures so that the minimum is zero and the maximum is one by subtracting the minimum value and the dividing by the maximum value in order to produce comparable coefficients in our regression estimates.

We also include a series of demographic controls. We measure income based on three categories: under \$30,000 a year; \$30-\$70,000 a year, and over \$70,000 a year. We measure education based on three categories: high school degree or less; some college or a college degree; and post college education. We also include indicator variable for race and sex, and state of resident. We measure religious attendance by whether the respondent attends church weekly; monthly; or seldom or never.

We constructed survey weights based on the 2008 Current Population Survey to adjust for non-response so that our final estimates reflect the registered voter populations in each state. Our models were estimated using Stata 11.1 and we employed robust standard errors.

Models 1 through 3 in Table 1 examine the correlates of feeling very positively about the Tea Party Movement using logistic regressions. Separate analysis, available from the authors, examines feelings toward the movement as ordinal scale and produces comparable results. Model 1 models strong support for the TPM as a function of demographics. Net of other factors, men are more likely than women and whites are more Africans Americans to support the movement. We found no significant differences based on education or income. Those who attend religious services are more likely than those who do not to support the movement, as are people in North

Carolina. Model 2 add a control for political beliefs. The coefficient is statistically significant as conservatives are more likely to support the movement than others. While sex and race remain significant predictors, the coefficients for religious attendance are no longer significantly different from zero.

Table 1 Model 3 includes the four cultural disposition measures along with demographic and political variables. Each of the new measures is statistically significant, and high values of each are associated with being more likely to strongly support the TPM. Based on this model, Table 2 lists the predicted probability of feeling very positive about the TPM. For each of our four cultural dispositions measures and the political belief scale, we compute the probability with a low score (as defined by the value at the 5<sup>th</sup> percentile) and a high score (as defined by the value at the 95<sup>th</sup> percentile), holding all other variables constant. Political beliefs have the largest independent effect, as almost no liberals are likely to support the movement. The authoritarian, libertarian, and nativist scales have comparable effect size, as moving from a low to a high value has increases the predicted probability of strongly supporting the TPM by approximately .1. Ontological insecurity is associated with a .14 point increase. That is, those who feel ontologically insecure are more than twice as likely to support the movement than others, even controlling for the other cultural dispositions and political beliefs.

Combined, these results strongly suggests that these four cultural dispositions are associated with attitudes toward the Tea Party, and the movement cannot be fully understood without explaining how the movement is able to coalesce these strands. More broadly, however, some of these cultural strands help explain the Republican Party. Table 1 model 4 uses logistic regression to model the likelihood an individual with describe himself or herself as a member of the Republican Party. After controlling for political beliefs, nativism and ontological insecurity are significant predictors of Republican Party membership, while our measures of authoritarianism and libertarianism have no significant effect. These findings suggests that the TPM is best understood as a new cultural expression of the late-20th-century Republican Party, reinforcing pre-existing strands of nativism and ontological insecurity while highlighting

libertarian and authoritarian strands.

### *Cultural Work*

The TPM's activation of cultural imagery, metaphor and history gives this movement its powerful symbolic resonance, animates its activists, and dominates media coverage of the movement. Culture gives people the tools to understand and relate new events to old ones; it gives the past meaning for the present. Culture also provides collective accounts of individual experiences, frustrations, and aspirations. For organizations such as the TPM, cultural symbols and practices provide the glue to hold together otherwise disparate bundles of ideas and dispositions.

The TPM's cultural work begins with the name itself: a nostalgic connection to the American Revolution's protest against taxation without representation. It can further be found in the TPM's recurring cultural theme of returning to the ideals of the Constitution. Like the Tea Party name, this theme is selectively nostalgic; it encourages TPM members and the public to "return" to values claimed to have been lost. According to one Tea Party volunteer: "We don't want the big government that's taking over everything we worked so hard for...the government's becoming too powerful... we want to take back what our Constitution said. You read the Constitution. Those values – that's what we stand for." Such emotional statements are rooted in feelings of ontological insecurity and are consistent with expressions of earlier right wing movements that were based in status defense and organized around traditionalism and desire for a simpler, purer past. In fact, concern over the fast pace of change has recently been shown to be a primary motivator for a variety of cultural conflicts and protest in the U.S., not just for the TPM.

In our follow-up poll, 84% of those positive towards the TPM said the Constitution should be interpreted "as the Founders intended," compared to only 34% of other respondents. Other respondents were also three times more likely not to have an opinion on the issue, highlighting the salience of the question for TPM supporters. Support for Constitutional principles is not absolute. TPM supporters were twice as likely than others to favor a

constitutional amendment banning flag burning; many also support efforts to overturn citizenship as defined by the Fourteenth Amendment. That TPM supporters simultaneously want to honor the founders' Constitution and alter that same document highlights the political flexibility of the cultural symbols they draw on.

The TPM supporters' inconsistent views of the Constitution suggests that their nostalgic embrace of the document is animated more by a network of cultural associations than a thorough commitment to the original text. In fact, such inconsistencies around policy, whether on the right or left, highlight what many sociologists see as the growing importance of culture in political life. The Constitution – and Tea Party more generally – take on heightened symbolic value and come to represent a 'way of life' or a "world view" rather than a specific set of laws or policy positions.

The cultural memory of the Boston Tea Party itself, emphasized in press coverage of the movement, is heavily linked to the libertarian cultural disposition that favors limited government. The implied claim is that the tax revolt of the Revolution matches the call for lower taxes today. One Tea Partier aptly stated:

"You have a government which can always tax and tax and tax...and this is just one concept that the Tea Party recognizes as a problem: the greed of centralized government...which takes away the responsibility of individuals to do anything."

Like the Constitution, the Boston Tea Party becomes a cultural trope only loosely connected to the historical record. The original revolt was about taxation without representation, while current complaints follow a democratically elected president who won the electoral vote 365 to 173 with 57 percent of citizens voting. Moreover, the deployment of the Tea Party imagery in politics is quite flexible. In the 1970s, activists drew upon the revolt of 1773 in order to argue, not for lower taxes, but for a more progressive tax system.

While the libertarian strand is strong, the wistful nostalgia of TPM supporters remembering simpler times is primarily comprised of a blend of ontological insecurity (fear of change) and nativist dispositions. One rally organizer summed up the sentiment of several people at the rally: "And why do you think they [illegal immigrants] wanted to come? They wanted to



come because it [the U.S.] is successful. But after they get here, what do they want to do? They want to change it. And see, you can't change it and be successful. It just won't work..." This mix of nativism and fear of change is also expressed by the distance TPM supporters feel from President Obama. While 41% of TPM supporters felt that former president Clinton was "not at all" like them, 81% felt that way about President Obama. Less than a third of Christian TPM think of Obama as a Christian.

Exploring this nativism strand, Table 3 uses data from our fall survey to explore the distance that Tea Party Members feel towards President Obama. Model 1 models that likelihood that the overwhelmingly Christian TPMers will agree that President Obama is a Christian. In addition to our standard demographic controls employed in Table 1, we also include a measure interacting political beliefs with TPM support. We combine the small number of liberal TPM supporter with political moderates to create a new categorical variable with five possible values: liberal, moderate who does not support the TPM, moderate/liberal who supports the TPM; conservative who does not support the TPM and conservative who does support the TPM. As shown in Model 1, among non-TPM members, conservatives are significantly more like than moderates to view Obama as not a Christian, and moderates are more like than liberals. Within each political belief category, TPM members are significantly more likely to view Obama as a not a Christian. Model 1 also presents the predicted probabilities based on political ideology and TPM status with all other variables constant. Net of other factors, 66% of conservatives who support the TPM would view Obama as not a Christian, compared to 46% of non-TPM conservatives. Among moderates, 52% of TPM supporters would not view Obama as a Christian, compared to only 28% of non-TPM supporters.

Models 2 and 3 further explore this distance by analyze the likelihood that a respondent would strongly disagree that President Clinton (Model 2) and President Obama (Model 3) is like the respondent and his/her friends. Controlling for demographics, TPM conservatives are the most likely to view Obama as dissimilar from themselves, with a predicted probability of .77. TPM moderates follow closely behind at .66, nearly double the rate of non-TPM conservatives

(.38) and triple the rate of non-TPM moderates (.21). The figures can be compared the probabilities of finding former President Clinton very unlike the respondent presented in Table 2. While non-liberals are more distant from President Obama than the prior Democratic President, the largest increases are among TPM members. These regression findings highlight the way that TPMers think of President Obama as the embodiment of something different from themselves, and very different from their cultural memory of the participants in the original Boston Tea Party.

### **Comparison**

We conducted another poll of registered voters of North Carolina ([n=1,178]) and Tennessee (n=1,038) in the spring of 2011. Our focus here was on the extent to which the relationships between support for Tea Party and support for issues who had become politicized and issues that had not changed between 2010 and 2011. The major political event that occurred during this time period was the Republican takeover of the House of Representatives, an event that many analysts credited to the influence of the TPM. To compare the two time periods, we combined both the 2010 and 2011 surveys into one dataset and model an interaction term between support for the TPM and survey year.

As shown in Model 1, Table 1, TPM supporters did begin to view the federal government more favorable than others. While conservative political beliefs and TPM support were both negatively correlated with having a favorable attitude toward the federal government, this effect declined for TPM supporters by about 25% after the TPM's electoral success in 2010, based on the significant interaction effect between TPM support and the dummy variable for 2011.

We also found evidence that attitudes in two policy areas became more rightwing among TPM supporters. While unions and immigration are not central to the TPM discourse, issues in both policy areas featured prominently in the news. As shown in model 2 and model 3, which model respondents' favorability toward labor unions and immigrants, respectively, TPM supporters turned even more against these groups in 2011 than in 2010, based on the interaction term.

In contrast, we find no relative change in TPM supporters' attitudes towards measures of

authoritarianism and libertarianism. Our measures of these were fairly far removed from recent political debates in Washington—should there be more rules about what can be shown on television (model 4); obey parents is more important than a child's personal responsibility (model 5); and respect for elders is more important than a child thinking for herself (model 6). While each of these attitudes is associated with TPM support, the magnitude of this relationship did not change between 2010 based on the insignificant interaction effect.

We interpret this as meaning that Tea Party supporters becoming more stringently opposed to issues that are on the political agenda -- unions, homosexuality, role of federal government, immigration. But, as you would expect, they are not becoming any more authoritarian, ontologically insecure, concerned about media, worried about atheists. That is, we see no movement on broader, general, not-policy-specific dispositions but we do see movement on more policy specific issues that are explicitly invoked in political debates. The TP is becoming hardened politically and more partisan. It is "becoming" the super conservative core of the Republican Party

### **Conclusion**

It is a truism of American politics that the first midterm election in a presidential administration results in losses for the President's party. This pattern happened in 1982 under President Reagan, 1994 under President Clinton, and would likely have happened in 2002 under President Bush if not for the increased trust in government after the 2001 terror attacks. Recognizing that the 2008-2010 Tea Party Movement is one such backlash is key to understanding what is new about it and what is not. The coalition of views that makes up the TPM is largely the same that makes up the Republican Party. What is new about the TPM is its syncretic cultural work melding 21st-century discontent to the symbolic memory of 18<sup>th</sup> century America. The words of one TPM supporter say it all: "We want to save America. We want to see this country go back to the original success formula that made us what we are today."



Works Cited

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Table 1. Logisitic regression models of strong support for the Tea Party Movement.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Tea Party	Tea Party	Tea Party	Republican
Male	0.591** (0.152)	0.521** (0.170)	0.353+ (0.180)	0.0429 (0.169)
Race				
African American	-1.507** (0.370)	-1.437** (0.377)	-1.316** (0.373)	-1.985** (0.365)
Education (HS omitted)				
Some college	0.0565 (0.198)	0.125 (0.217)	0.0155 (0.224)	-0.0228 (0.204)
College degree	-0.137 (0.232)	0.110 (0.235)	0.133 (0.244)	0.326 (0.232)
Post college degree	-0.307 (0.271)	0.343 (0.292)	0.295 (0.309)	0.176 (0.250)
Income (Under \$30K omitted)				
\$30K-70K	-0.0686 (0.183)	-0.175 (0.202)	-0.160 (0.208)	-0.236 (0.195)
\$70K+	-0.0894 (0.225)	-0.111 (0.246)	-0.113 (0.253)	0.104 (0.222)
Religious attendance (seldom/none omitted)				
Services, weekly	0.327+ (0.191)	-0.289 (0.212)	-0.274 (0.221)	0.228 (0.198)
Services, monthly	0.498* (0.233)	0.324 (0.267)	0.283 (0.275)	0.857** (0.249)
State (North Carolina omitted)				
Tennessee	-0.283+ (0.157)	-0.519** (0.166)	-0.468** (0.175)	-0.210 (0.160)
Political beliefs				
Conservative beliefs		5.286** (0.480)	4.481** (0.499)	4.216** (0.382)
Cultural dispositions				
Authoritarian scale			0.739* (0.301)	-0.140 (0.274)
Libertarian scale			0.834* (0.373)	-0.308 (0.359)
Nativism scale			0.784* (0.306)	0.551* (0.278)
Ontological insecurity			1.238** (0.263)	0.555** (0.186)
Constant	-1.349** (0.237)	-5.145** (0.481)	-6.451** (0.588)	-4.374** (0.412)
N	2273	2272	2267	2273

Standard errors in parentheses

+  $p < .1$ , \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$



Table 2. Predicted Probabilities of strong support for the TPM based on Table 1 model 3 with other variables held constant. Values at the 5<sup>th</sup> percentile are used for Low and values at the 95<sup>th</sup> percentile for high.

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Low</b>	<b>Hi</b>
Authoritarian scale	0.169	0.261
Libertarian scale	0.211	0.311
Nativism scale	0.183	0.287
Ontological insecurity	0.114	0.255
Conservative beliefs	0.029	0.388



Table 3. Logistic regression models of beliefs about President Obama and President Clinton.

	(1) Obama not Christian	(2) Clinton very dissimilar	(3) Obama very dissimilar
Sex			
Male	-0.200 (0.324)	-0.139 (0.336)	0.568 (0.346)
Race			
African American	-2.052** (0.730)	-0.936 (0.823)	-2.842** (0.731)
Education (HS omitted)			
Some college	0.257 (0.470)	0.127 (0.407)	0.716 (0.461)
College degree	-0.136 (0.481)	0.453 (0.441)	0.339 (0.476)
Post college degree	-0.701 (0.548)	0.321 (0.530)	-0.171 (0.592)
Income (Under \$30K omitted)			
\$30K-70K	-0.700 (0.425)	-0.216 (0.387)	-0.0888 (0.425)
\$70K+	-0.839* (0.418)	-0.671 (0.448)	-0.789+ (0.453)
Religious attendance (seldom/none omitted)			
Services, weekly	0.653+ (0.377)	1.059** (0.390)	0.707+ (0.387)
Services, monthly	0.419 (0.538)	0.989* (0.465)	0.495 (0.624)
State (North Carolina omitted)			
Tennessee	0.105 (0.327)	-0.810** (0.307)	-0.0789 (0.364)
Political Beliefs (Liberal omitted)			
Moderate	1.801** (0.612)	0.984 (0.773)	2.211** (0.841)
TPM Moderate	2.902** (0.704)	3.072** (0.802)	4.555** (0.935)
Conservative	2.640** (0.587)	2.816** (0.647)	3.178** (0.834)
TPM Conservative	3.586** (0.585)	3.600** (0.612)	5.232** (0.835)
Constant	-2.377** (0.704)	-3.976** (0.734)	-4.162** (1.009)
<i>N</i>	518	534	531
<i>Predicted Probabilities</i>			
Liberal	0.068	0.025	0.0306
Moderate	0.286	0.064	0.208

TPM Moderate	0.516	0.329	0.659
Conservative	0.459	0.279	0.382
TPM Conservative	0.660	0.441	0.766

Standard errors in parentheses

+  $p < .1$ , \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$

Table 4. Regressions models comparing the effect of Tea Party support in 2010 and 2011 on attitudes.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Federal Gov- ernment	Unions	Immigrants	TV Rules	Children Obey	Children Respect
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Tea Party Supporter	-0.924***	-0.593***	0.069	0.182**	0.290*	0.338*
	(0.052)	(0.067)	(0.073)	(0.056)	(0.117)	(0.136)
2011	-0.074	0.074	-0.095*	0.050	0.050	0.109
	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.077)	(0.080)
<b>2011#Tea Party Supporter</b>	<b>0.251**</b>	<b>-0.296**</b>	<b>-0.313**</b>	<b>-0.002</b>	<b>-0.019</b>	<b>0.010</b>
	<b>(0.077)</b>	<b>(0.092)</b>	<b>(0.102)</b>	<b>(0.085)</b>	<b>(0.168)</b>	<b>(0.199)</b>
Conservative beliefs	-0.386***	-0.408***	-0.252***	-0.279***	0.415***	0.516***
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.032)	(0.033)
HS degree	-0.281***	-0.241***	0.109	0.212***	-0.747***	-0.544***
	(0.058)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.044)	(0.105)	(0.124)
Some college	-0.259***	-0.459***	0.342***	0.366***	-1.039***	-0.937***
	(0.058)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.050)	(0.106)	(0.122)
College degree	-0.213***	-0.369***	0.345***	0.437***	-1.232***	-1.248***
	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.054)	(0.113)	(0.125)
\$30K-70K	-0.280***	-0.336***	0.066	0.090*	-0.372***	-0.332***
	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.040)	(0.087)	(0.097)
\$70K+	-0.352***	-0.638***	0.052	0.204***	-0.610***	-0.598***
	(0.057)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.052)	(0.104)	(0.112)
Tennessee	0.001	0.072	0.036	-0.043	-0.073	-0.050
	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.034)	(0.068)	(0.073)
Constant	4.492***	5.049***	3.839***	2.551***	-0.451**	-0.177
	(0.087)	(0.085)	(0.087)	(0.079)	(0.154)	(0.163)
N	4135	4136	4133	4144	4124	4116

