native program in terms of a *virtuality* of doing. Then, possession of the tools for thought analysis---"theory" and "methods," which respectively represent "being-able-to-do/and knowing-how-to-do---"authorizes" the steps taken by the researcher and makes it possible to move to the stage of *actualization* (the phase of realization of the cognitive program having given way to the exercise itself of the cognitive doing).

We now have, superimposed on the utterances of doing, a second discursive level, composed of *modal utterances* and which is responsible for enabling the subject to undertake the quest for knowledge and bring it to a successful conclusion. This foundational discourse (in the sense that it finds the enunciative competence of the subject) corresponds, from the point of view of the organization of discourse into narrative sequences, to the qualifying test—as opposed to operative discourse, which, because it describes the scientific doing itself, converges the sequence of the decisive test. Whereas the subject (as operator) had at an earlier stage come into contact with the object, here he is correlated with a *receiver* with whom at times will be manifested as an autonomous instance that (transitively) attributes to the researcher the means whereby to produce "true" utterances, and at times will appear on the contrary in syncrètism with the enunciator. In this case, the latter (reflexively) gives to himself the elements that justify his own "right" to enunciation. In both cases, beyond the modalization of the "re-"sequence, and its transformation into a true ben-subject (with, however, this difference that, as opposed to the subject of a popular story, his distant eponym, he carries out the main part of his quest within the cognitive, not pragmatic, dimension), in reality it is the epistemic conditions of "truth saying"—in other words, the conditions for theoretical possibility of knowledge—that are at play at this level.

Given this, the position and status assigned to the sender as *epistemic instance* will give us a further criterion by which to distinguish between two types (or subtypes) of discourse: the *discourse of discovery* on the one hand, in which the function of sender tends to become objectified into a figure that is distinct from that of the discoursing subject, and the reflexive *discourse of questioning* on the other hand, in which the enunciator subject makes himself his own receiver. To this first opposition, which can be seen in the narrative organization of actantial syntax, there corresponds at the same time, at the discursive and semantic level, a parallel difference that has to do with the relative manner of being present and degree of stability: different for each author, of the two great isoposes—epistemological versus methodological—which are characteristic of scientific discourse in general.

The Discourse of Discovery in terms of its being a narrative configuration, the mechanism for "discovery" constitutes one of the schemas that is common to all of the texts analyzed in the first part of this volume (whereas it is concretely present with the other authors only in an accessory way, at the most). The way the epistemic instance appears on the scene is like the occurrence of an event, a more or less unexpected event—a "chance occurrence," to use Dumézil's term—that consists in, at a given moment in the knowing subject's movement toward discovery, meeting up with the object of knowledge. From this meeting there has been a certitude, an immediate obviousness. The sender, guarantor here of the "conviction" (Siegfried) thus attained, can, as is the case with Dumézil, be shaded out and maintain a kind of anonymous identity. As "something that seems to resemble order appears beyond chaos," it is the "human mind," which is both sender and object of knowledge, that allows us to see the principles according to which it functions. In both cases, the automatization of the epistemic instance (as narrative actant)—that is, its projection beyond the subject—is, at first sight paradoxically, accompanied by a near atrophy of the epistemological dimension (as discursive isotopy). When examined more closely, it is as if, faced with an object of knowledge that almost "of itself" proclaims its own "truth" (certain preconditions having, of course, been fulfilled, as we shall soon see), the subject finds himself freed of the need to provide his own account of the a priori proofs of his epistemic competence. This implies that there already exist models of intelligibility vis-à-vis the activity of the knowing subject. From this point of view, this same role of guarantor for scientific knowledge that, in Lévi-Strauss is assigned to the "real" (reality in his "guide"), is, in Mauss, given an "atmosphere." This "atmosphere," in Dumézil, is significant for the very organization of the mythical corpus of reference. In Siegfried it is significant in terms of the "intelligibility" of "laws" inherent in "politics."

Of course this preconception concerning the "objectivization" of the epistemic conditions for cognitive doing must not be confused with the epistemologically naïve attitude that conceives of the production of knowledge in terms of an immediate apprehension and description of what is empirically given. The structures that guarantee the possibility for knowledge do not appear, with any author studied here, as immediately manifest. On the contrary, for them to become obvious to the enunciator, they had to first be "discovered": whence Lévi-Strauss's "h Nebulous" metaphor and, more generally, the need, on the part of the subject, to, make it possible in his own activity for a meeting up with the epistemic sender. This, for example, with Franckest, happens because there has been an earlier break with the opposite and deceptive instance of the antisender (sometimes represented by "intuitionism"). It can happen, on the contrary, as with Lévi-Strauss, because there has been an initial enlightened and "intuitive" choice. In Mauss and Siegfried, it happens through attempts to take up a position at what might be called an "appropriate distance" from the object.

To the extent that here, despite all this, the subject remains the beneficiary of a competence that, in essence, he receives as a "gift" (or through an "imitation"